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SINGER ON SPECIESISM 
by 
Kevin Donaghy 
If you subscribe to the view that the killing of a man is a more serious matter 
than the killing of a chicken, or that something is radically amiss about the 
practice of producing expensive pet food when children are starving in Biafra, 
then you are, to use Professor Singer's term, a speciesist. But I don't think this 
label should bother you. Speciesism is, I think, a defensible position. 
When one judges that it is a more serious maUer to kill a man than a chicken 
or that it is morally wrong that so much money is spent on pet food when 
children are starving, one is not excluding animals from membership in the 
moral community, as Singer som�times seems to suggest. Nor would one want 
to. It is intuitively clear that certain ways of treating animals are objectionable 
on moral grounds. What one is doing when one makes such judgments is 
tacitly assigning human beings a privileged position in that community. One is 
suggesting that, othe.r things being equal, when the interests of human beings 
conflict with the interests of animals, the former are to be given the greater 
weight. 
What would justify speciesism? Singer observes that if human beings are to be 
regarded as morally privileged in this way, there must be some characteristic 
which is possessed by humans but not by animals, or possessed by humans in a 
higher degree than animals, and which justifies assigning greater weight to the 
interests of humans. And a good part of his argument is designed to show that 
there can be no such characteristic. I would like to examine two of those 
arguments. 
Suppose that superior intelligence is said to be the morally relevant character­
istic. If superior intelligence does not entitle one man to exploit another, then 
why, asks Singer, should it entitle humans to exploit non-humans? The word 
'exploit' is unfortunate, since exploitation is presumably never justified. But 
there is an argument here, and it amounts to this. We would all agree that 
superior intelligence does not entitle one man to a more privileged position in 
the moral community than another. If we are to be consistent, we should also 
agree that superior intelligence does not entitle humans to a more privileged 
position than animals. So-if anything does entitle humans to special considera­
tion, it is certainly not superior intelligence. 'Ibis argument presumably can be 
generalized to rule out not only intelligence but any characteristic that is 
possessed by humans in a higher degree than animals. 
Is this a sound argument; I am inclined to think not. Suppose someone were 
to reason as follows. We all agree that greater experience and maturity do not 
entitle one man to the obedience of another. So we should all agree, if we are to 
be consistent, that greater experience and maturity do not entitle adults to the 
obedience of children. Therefore, if anything does entitle adults to the obedience 
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of children, it is not the greater experience and maturity of the former. This 
piece of reasoning is quite obviously unsound. Since Professor Singer's argument 
exhibits the same form, it too would appear to be unsound. 
What entitles adults to the obedience of children is not their greater ex· 
perience and maturity as such, but the absence in children of a certain minimal 
level of experience and maturity. It may well be true, and I think it is, that whil.e 
superior intelligence1 as such does not entitle humans to a privileged position in 
the moral community, the absence in animals of a certain minimal level of 
jntelligencel does. At any rate, Singer's argument does not succeed in ruling out 
intelligence, or anything else for that matter, as a morally relevant characteristic. 
A second argument put forward by Singer amounts to this. Take any 
characteristic which ii.s said to justify a privileged moral status for humans­
again, for example, intelligence. One invariably finds that some animals, adult 
pigs for example, possess that characteristic in a higher degree than some 
humans, human infants, for example. If anything, an adult pig is more 
intelligent than a human infant. The speciesist might obje'Ct that in as much as 
the infant is potentially an adult, he is to be granted the same moral status. But 
then he is left with the problem, insuperable if one is to believe Singer, of 
explaining how "mere potential gives rise to rights." 
Singer is here assuming that a normal human infant, while potentially more 
intelligent than an adult pig, is actually less intelligent. And this, it seems to me, 
is just false. To say that an animal, wl)ether human or otherwise, has a certain 
level of intelligence iis .to say something 111ot about his actual but about his 
potential problem solving abilities, 
Suppose I am listening to a three year old playing the piano and I remark 
that the child is talented. When I make this remark, I do not mean to say that 
the child plays well. Most likely, he plays very badly. What I do mean to say is 
that he has the potential to become an excellent player. Similarly, if I observe 
a th�e year old an9 remark that he is very intelligent, I do not mean to say that 
he thinks efficiently or productively, or that he is able to complete successfully 
certain complex intellectual tasks. After all, a three year old, however intel· 
ligent he may be, is not able to do any of these things. What I do mean to say is 
that he has the capacity or pot�ntial (as ye_t unrealized) to think efficiently!and 
productively. When a child, however young, provides evidence of superior 
intelligence, we do not say that ttie child is p9tentially intelligent, we. say 
simply that he is intemgent. Thus, it is a mistake to say that a.n adult pig is more 
intelligent than a normal human infant,, since the infant's potential to think and 
act intelligently, and hence his intell_igence, far outstrips that of the animal. 
Adult pigs may not be more intelligent than normal human in.fants, but 
certainly they are more intellige_nt than some human beings, all those whose 
intellectual potential is even more limited than that of the pig, the massively 
brain damaged, for example. So isn't Professor Singer's objection sustained 
after am I think not. The speciesist who ad9pts superior intelligence as the 
characteristic which j us ti fies man's p,rfvileged status in the moral community is 
committed to the view that such human vegetables do not enjoy this status. 
But this should pose no particular problem for the speciesist. In fact, it may 
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well be fully in accord with his intuitions. It certainly is with mine. While the 
killing of a normally intelligent infant is just as serious an offense as the killing 
of a normally intelligent adult, both acts would seem to be far more serious 
than the killing of a person so severely limited that he lacked the intellectual 
capacities of an adult pig. 
Very briefly, I would like to ask why superior intelligence does appear to be 
a likely candidate for the characteristic, if there is one, which justifies man's 
privileged position in the moral community. After all, animals are in many 
respects superior to ourselves. They have greater strength, speed, more highly 
developed sensory apparatus, and so on. So isn't it rather a case of stacking the 
deck to choose the one area in which humans are clearly superior to animals? 
Not really. Concomitant with supenor intelligence are a number of important 
capacities, the capacities for great virtue, for great love, for great suffering, for 
great happiness, anµ so on. These capacities do intuitively appear to be morally 
relevant, relevant in the sense that our moral attitudes toward entities, the 
value we place on them, and the ways in which we treat them should be 
determined at least in part by the presence or absence of these capacities. 
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